ABSTRACT

In view of the long-standing problem of unstable demand matching between incoming materials and resource products in the construction waste resource utilization industry, a four-party evolutionary game model including construction waste exporters, construction waste processors, and purchasers is constructed under the background of the Chain Chief System with the guidance of the local government as the dominant player, and the strategic choices of the main parties in the process of construction waste resource utilization are analyzed. The game model is constructed to analyse the strategic choices of each subject in the process of construction waste resource utilization, and through numerical analysis, we explore the influence of local government's regulatory costs, rewards and punishments, and relevant elements of the cooperation and sharing model on the behavioral choices of the resource utilization subjects. The results show that: the amount of environmental protection tax is closely related to the strategy evolution trend of each subject; the high cost of subsidy is not conducive to the continuous supervision of the government, and with the passage of time, the local government will gradually converge to the state of not subsidizing but only punishing; and the clear co-benefit mechanism is conducive to the choice of cooperation and sharing strategy of the exporter and the processor.