ABSTRACT

Tunnel projects inevitably encounter problematic geology in mountainous environments, which are uniquely complex. The risk of a water surge sharply increases when a tunnel crosses a water-rich fault, which threatens serious environmental damage. Previous studies have not considered the complex game relationships among stake-holders in this process, even though failed supervision by stakeholders is an important cause of water surge accidents. In this study, an evolutionary game model between government regulators, construction enterprises, and the public is constructed. Numerical simulations are performed to explore the impacts of various factors on the strategic choices of the participants and to analyze their evolutionary behavior. It is found that when a participant actively benefits, the compliant treatment of the water surge is more likely. The initial willingness to participate in water surge treatment is also found to affect the strategy choice and the evolution rate of each participant. Proper treatment is encouraged by penalties for construction enterprises, the provision of government subsidies, and active public participation. The results of this work have noteworthy implications for the safety management of railroad tunnel projects.