Editorial Type: RESEARCH ARTICLES
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Online Publication Date: 25 Nov 2025

PROMOTING LOW-CARBON BUILDING THROUGH MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION UNDER THE INTERACTIVE GAME PERSPECTIVE

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Article Category: Research Article
Page Range: 313 – 346
DOI: 10.3992/jgb.20.4.313
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ABSTRACT

Low-carbon building (LCB) promotion is important for reducing carbon emissions from existing buildings that significantly impact global climate change, which requires stakeholder cooperation. However, the stakeholders of LCB promotion lack a good cooperative relationship, hampering LCB development in China. In this study, the interests and conflicts of the tripartite core stakeholders in the LCB industrial chain, including the government, developers, and consumers, are examined. The key variables of the interactive game among them are identified, and the evolution trends of their behavioral strategies are analyzed through the evolutionary game model. Additionally, the system dynamics theory is applied to map the dynamical flow of the tripartite system. A case study of LCBs in China is performed, and simulation analysis of the variable assignments is conducted based on actual research results. Thus, the specific effects of the key variables on the evolution path of stakeholder behavior and the system stability are determined. On this basis, effective strategies can be formulated to promote tripartite cooperation in LCB development and accelerate their implementation in China. The results demonstrate that: (1) The optimal stable state for rapid LCB promotion in the current stage is when the government adopts the supervision strategy, developers adopt the development strategies, and consumers adopt the purchasing strategy. (2) Moderately increasing government economic incentives to developers and consumers, controlling policy costs, and improving incremental social benefits to the government can effectively promote the optimal stable system state. (3) Consumers are more responsive to government economic incentives than developers. Therefore, solely focusing on developers cannot effectively promote the LCB market. These research findings can provide theoretical support and valuable insights for enhancing stakeholder cooperation in LCB promotion and improving the effectiveness of government incentive policies.

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